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I. Introduction 
 
It has been a great pleasure for the authors to be able to prepare a report on the Netherlands 
regarding “The mutual assistance in tax affairs”, which topic will be discussed at the  EATLP 
annual meeting in June 2009 in Santiago de Compostella. The report has been limited by us to 
such mutual assistance between the Member States of the European Union.  The report is 
based on the general guidelines as prepared by our German colleague Prof. Dr Roman Seer of 
Bochum University. The questions and answers are focussed onthe five main topics “Imple-
mentation”, “Use”, “Efficiency”, “Burden of proof” and “Legal protection”. Since the focus is 
on the actual use of mutual assistance in the different Member States, the report is rather fac-
tually and practically oriented. We did however, occasionally point at more in depth discus-
sions and unclarities in this area. 
As regards the implementation of various legal instruments, it can be concluded that it took a 
few years in the Netherlands before domestic legislation implementing the mutual assistance 
as included in the relevant EU Directives and tax treaties was introduced. This can probably 
be explained by the fact that initially it was felt that no such additional legislation was re-
quired. It did, however, turn out to be useful or even necessary to also provide a domestic 
legal base in which it is e.g. also made clear in which cases the Netherlands would make use 
of the possibilities not to provide assistance as allowed under the various instruments. In view 
of the various instruments which may be used and the developments within these instruments 
(e.g. changes in the model provisions which are used as a basis to conclude tax treaties), it is 
not easy to have an overview of which provisions apply in relation to specific countries. In 
this respect the implementing rules, instructions and guidance as published by the tax authori-
ties are useful (albeit only in Dutch). 
The Netherlands has been rather active in actually applying the instruments as can be seen 
from the figures on the actual data exchanged. The issues regarding effectiveness or effi-
ciency are difficult to judge in view of lack of general criteria and also of relevant data. It is 
clear that there are major challenges in the automated processing of bulk information, whereas 
language problems may also cause difficulties. Although we have the impression that there is 
a continuous process of making this more efficient, it is in our view certainly an area which 
could and should be further developed.  
As regards the burden of proof, in the Netherlands generally the system is followed that the 
party who is in the best position to deliver proof should do so. In cases of lack of cooperation, 
the law contains provisions where the burden of proof is fully shifted to the taxpayer. A rather 
special case in this respect is the provision in the General Taxes Act which can, in specific 
circumstances, put the obligation on a company to provide information which is held abroad 
by related group companies or other bodies. 
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As regards the issue of legal protection in the Netherlands we would like to limit our remarks 
in this introduction to two aspects. Domestic law in the area of mutual assistance is increas-
ingly challenged on general principles as included in human rights treaties, albeit so far not 
very successfully. Furthermore, it should be noted that the the Netherlands has a system of 
prior notification of taxpayers before information is exchanged (with exceptions for automatic 
exchange and cases of tax evasion). In such system it is important to find the right balance 
between efficiency of timely assistance and taxpayer rights. It may be interesting for other 
countries to reflect on this not only from the perspective of taxpayer rig and efficiency, but 
also from a perspective of safeguarding the state against claims and liabilities in case informa-
tion was not accurate or even relating to a different person. 
We hope you will enjoy reading the report ad that it may contribute to a fruitful discussion. 
 
 
 
II. Questions of implementation  
 
Question 1 and 2) As far as the mutual assistance in tax affairs is concerned not only the tax 
assessment but also the collection of the taxes is of importance. Consequently several Council 
Directives are relevant for this topic. 
When did your country implement the following Council Directives: 
• “Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for 
the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other meas-
ures”, 
•  “Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual as-
sistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of di-
rect taxation”, 
• “Commission Directive 2002/94/EC of 9 December 2002 laying down de-
tailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Council Directive 
76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain 
levies, duties, taxes and other measures”, 
• “Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income 
in the form of interest payments”? 
 
In which legal rules can the implementation be found? 
 
Answer 1 and 2) 
The date of implementation of the various relevant EC Directives in the area of mutual assis-
tance in tax matters, and the laws and implementing decisions are as follows: 
 
a. Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of 
tax claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, by: 
  
1. “Wet wederzijdse bijstand bij de invordering van belastingschulden en enkele andere 
schuldvorderingen”(Act on the mutual assistance in the recovery of tax claims and some other 
debt claims), Act of 24 October 1979, Stb. 572, as last amended by Act of 11 December 2002, 
Stb. 619; 
 
2. “Uitvoeringsregeling wederzijdse bijstand bij de invordering van belastingschulden en en-
kele andere schuldvorderingen” (Implementing decision mutual asssistance in the recovery of 
tax claims and some other debt claims), Decision of 27 May 2003, nr.WDB2003/157M, Stcrt. 
2003, 102); 
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3.” Leidraad Invordering 2008” (Guidance recovery 2008, Decision of 12 June 2008 nr. CCP 
2008/1137M. Of this large document, in particular Art. 78 on international recovery is rele-
vant. 
 
b. Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977, concerning mutual assistance by 
the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, by : 
 
1. “Wet op de internationale bijstandsverlening bij de heffing van belastingen” (Act on the 
international administrative assistance in the levying of taxes), Act of 24 April 1986 , Stb. 
249, as last amended by Act of  3 July 2008,  Stb. 262; 
 
2. “Uitvoeringsregeling internationale bijstandsverlening bij de heffing van belastin-
gen”(Implementing decision on the international administrative assistance in the levying of 
taxes), a Decision of 17 December 2004, nr WDB04-748 as last amended on 25 February 
2007. Stcrt. 2007, 39;  
 
3.”Besluit Mandaatverlening bevoegde autoriteit inzake internationale uitwisseling van inlich-
tingen” (Decision on granting a mandate to act as competent authority for the international 
exchange of information), last Decision of 28 February 2006, nr. CPP2005/3241 M 
(Stcrt.2006, 48) 
 
4.”Ondermandaatverlening internationale inlichtingenuitwisseling” (Granting subordinate 
mandate regarding the international exchange of information), most recent Decision of 28 
February 2006, , nr. CPP 2005/3242M, Stcrt. 2006, 48; 
 
5. “Voorschrift internationale inlichtingenuitwisseling inzake de belastingen waarop de Wet 
op de wederzijdse bijstand bij de heffing van belastingen van toepassing is” (Instruction inter-
national exchange of information regarding taxes which are covered by the Act on the interna-
tional administrative assistance in the levying of taxes), Decision of 6 April 2006, nr. 
CPP2006/546M, Stcrt.76). 
 
c. Commission Directive 2002/94/EC of 9 December 2002 establishing practical measures 
necessary for the implementation of certain provisions of Council Directive 76/308/EEC on 
mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other 
measures, by: 
 
 “Uitvoeringsregeling wederzijdse bijstand bij de invordering van belastingschulden en enkele 
andere schuldvorderingen” (Implementing decision on the mutual assistance in the recovery 
of tax claims and some other debt claims) , a decision of 27 May 2003, nr. WDB03-157 M, 
Stcrt.2003 102. 
 
d. Council Directive 2003/48/EG of 3 June 2003 on the taxation of savings income in the 
form of interest payments, by: 
 
“Wet tot wijziging van de Wet op de internationale bijstandsverlening bij de heffing van be-
lastingen en de Wet op de inkomstenbelasting 2001”, (Act amending the Act on the interna-
tional administrative assistance in the levying of taxes and the Income Tax 2001), Act of 18 
December 2003, Stb. 531. 
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Question 3) Does your country’s legislation provide a constitutional frame that rules the mu-
tual assistance in tax matters? Are there any conflicts or inconsistencies among constitutional 
guarantees for the taxpayer and rules concerning mutual assistance? Are there any conflicts or 
inconsistencies among the rules of human rights treaties and those concerning mutual assis-
tance? 
 
Answer 3) There are no specific provisions in the Constitution of the Netherlands dealing 
with the international mutual assistance in tax matters. However, there is a general Constitu-
tional framework regarding the legal position of treaties (including tax treaties and treaties 
relating to the European Union). These provisions relate e.g. to the ratification of treaties (ar-
ticle 91), the application of treaties (article 93), the supremacy of treaty provisions over provi-
sions of domestic law where the provisions in the treaty are considered to be binding for every 
citizen (“eenieder verbindend”) (article 94), and the way treaties are made known (article 95). 
There is some discussion concerning the question whether the treaty provisions on mutual 
assistance in tax matters are binding on the citizens as well. It is sometimes argued that they 
are just binding the states .  
It can also be mentioned, that according to article 104 of the Constitution, state taxes can only 
be levied on the basis of a law. In this context it should also be mentioned that in the Nether-
lands it is not possible to challenge the provisions of domestic legislation (if properly enacted) 
or of treaties (if properly ratified) as such against the Constitution. Disputes regarding the 
interpretation of domestic or treaty provisions can be dealt with under the regular appeal pro-
cedures (see also under VI). Domestic legislation or treaties could be challenged under other 
treaties, e.g. if the provisions concerned would violate Human Rights treaties or European 
law.  In this context it can be mentioned that supplementary assessments and related fines 
imposed on the basis of information on income from a Luxembourg bank account which in-
formation was exchanged by the Belgian tax authorities, have been challenged also with ref-
erence to the ECHR of 4 November 1950 (see e.g. Hof Amsterdam, MK I, 31 August 2006, 
nr. 05/00729, so called “KB-Lux” case). In the case referred to, these challenges were  based 
on illegitimate acquisition of documents/ breach of privacy by the foreign authorities (article 8 
ECHR; which claim was rejected) and undue delay in the appeal procedure (see article 6 of 
the ECHR Convention; the fine was reduced from 100% to 10%).   
Also in a case decided by the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad, 13 May 2005, nr. C04/014 a 
few aspects relating to the abovementioned Act on the international administrative assistance 
in the levying of taxes and ECHR were dealt with. In this case it was decided that this Act did 
not oblige the Dutch Tax Authorities to inform the taxpayer of the name of the requesting 
state, before the taxpayer had to cooperate with an investigation to recover the requested info, 
and thus the argument of the tax payer that the fact that he could not appeal against that re-
fusal of the Tax Authorities was contrary to article 6 ECHR, was not further considered in the 
verdict. Some other points related more to the general obligations to provide information then  
specifically to the international administrative assistance.   
The final outcome of most KB Lux procedures is yet unclear  because the Dutch Supreme 
Court (Hoge Raad 21 March 2008,  no. 43.05) requested a preliminary ruling from the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ)  on the compatibility of the Netherlands rules on issue of the addi-
tional assessment in the case of income maintained abroad or derived from foreign sources.  
In case of income maintained abroad or derived from foreign sources  the tax authorities can 
issue additional assessments during  a 12-years period starting from the time the tax liability 
arose, whereas in  case of income derived from domestic sources the period is only 5 years. 
The Supreme Court requested, amongst others, a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the 
compatibility of this distinction with the freedom to provide services and the free movement 
of capital of Arts. 49 and 56 of the EC Treaty. 
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For more details on the impact of human rights treaties, see the answers under VI below. 
 
As regards the relation to the Constitution, it can also be mentioned that in several instances 
tax payers claimed that elements of the acquisition or use of information were in violation of 
the Constitution. Reference can be made to articles 10 (regarding privacy protection), 13 (re-
garding protection of privacy of letters, telephone and telegraph messages, unless determined 
otherwise by law) and article 68 (to provide information by the government at request to the 
Houses of Parliament). These were as far as we know, so far rejected. In the abovementioned 
Supreme Court case of 13 May 2005 it was e.g. challenged whether there was a violation of 
article 13 ( the privacy of letters) in case of an investigation to acquire information of which it 
was at that time not yet sure whether it would be exchanged under the exchange of informa-
tion provision.. This was rejected since the Court interpreted article 8  of the act mentioned 
under answer 1 and 2, letter b.1 above to also comprise the investigation which may a.o. be 
used to determine whether information can be exchanged and thus is covered by the exception 
made in article 13 of the Constitution. Thus it was not considered  contrary to the Constitu-
tion. 
 
Question 4) Article 9 of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC allows Member States to make 
bilateral agreements on specific matters of fiscal cooperation (automatic exchanges of infor-
mation, simultaneous assessments etc.). Has your country concluded this kind of agreements? 
If so, with which Member States? 
 
Answer 4) Yes, such type of agreements have e.g. been concluded with 
Belgium   2004 
Czech Republic 2006 
Denmark  1999 
Estonia  2004 
France   1996 
Germany  1997 
Lithuania  2004 
Poland   2005 
Spain   2006 
Sweden  2004 
 
The Memoranda of Understanding were concluded on the basis of both the Directive 77/799 
and of the tax treaties with those countries, since the tax treaties also provide a legal basis for 
such cooperation. The tax tax treaties also contain rules determining which of the two coun-
tries is entitled to levy taxes on a specific category of income, which allocation may also in-
fluence the type of information a country may need. 
 
Question 5) According to article 1 paragraph 4 of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC para-
graph 1 should also apply to any identical or similar taxes imposed subsequently, whether in 
addition to or in place of the taxes listed in paragraph 3. This Council Directive has been 
amended by the “Council Directive 79/1070/EEC of 6 December 1979”, the “Council Direc-
tive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992”, the “Council Directive 2003/93/EC of 7 October 
2003”, the “Council Directive 2004/56/EC of April 2004” and the “Council Directive 
2004/106/EC of 16 November 2004”. Through these amendments more taxes became part of 
the scope of application of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC. Apart from these taxes did the 
scope of application of this legal rule increase in your country? 
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Answer 5) No, the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of Council Directive 77/99/EEC did not 
increase beyond what was changed by previous amendments. Actually, with respect to the 
Netherlands the scope has effectively been reduced since the “Vermogensbelasting” (Net 
Wealth Tax for individuals) which is listed, was abolished in 2001. Moreover: it should be 
mentioned that not all the amendments mentioned in the question led to an increase of the 
scope of the Directive. In 2003/93 the VAT and in 2004/ 106 the excises were “taken out”. 
 
Question 6) According to article 8 of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC a Member State’s 
competent authority has the right to refuse the provision of information in the cases named in 
article 8. How has this right been implemented in your country’s legal rules? For which of 
these reasons to refuse the exchange of information has a prohibition to provide information 
and for which the right (possibility) to refuse information been implemented in the national 
legal system? Why? 
 
Answer 6) Article 8 of the Directive is creating room for the supplying States to weigh their 
interests against those of the other States. The grounds for refusal (or “exceptions”) are for-
mulated as discretionary powers. In the Dutch Act on international administrative assistance 
in the levying of taxes, however, they have the character of prohibitions, except in case of the 
ground relating to business secrets.  
Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Directive which states there is no obligation to investigate or 
provide information if the law or administrative practice does not allow the requested state to 
do so, has been implemented in article 13, paragraph 1, letter c, Act on the international ad-
ministrative assistance in the levying of taxes. However in that Act it is even prohibited, since 
it might otherwise lead to a violation of the principle of legality, prescribing that the actions of 
the government should be based on the law, founded by means of a democratic process of 
legislation. The law itself should be comprehensible, predictable and stable.  
 
Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Directive deals with the commercial, industrial or professional 
secrets. It has been implemented in a similar (discretionary -possibility to refuse) way in arti-
cle 13, paragraph 3, Act on the international administrative assistance in the levying of taxes. 
However, as regards the international groundof “ordre public,” the implementation in article 
13, paragraph 1, letter b of the before mentioned Mutual Assistance Act is more strict since it 
prohibits the exchange in those cases. 
 
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Directive, regarding the reciprocity requirement has been im-
plemented in article 13, paragraph 1, letter e, of the Mutual Assistance Act. As regards that 
aspect, the Act contains a prohibition to exchange information in case of lack of reciprocity. 
The legislative history mentions the great importance of this principle.  
 
It should be mentioned that article 2, pargraph 1 of the Directive contains another possibility 
for a requested state to refuse to provide information, if the requesting state appears not to 
have first endeavoured to acquire the information itself which it might have done without jeo-
pardizing the result of it (the principle of subsidiarity).  
A similar provision, albeit stricter, is included in article 13, paragraph 1, letter d of the ab-
ovementioned Act, which only requires that it is likely that the principle was violated as a 
ground for forbidding the exchange of information in such situations,  
  
In this context it should, however, also be mentioned that in paragraph 4 of article 13 of the 
Act, it is stated that this article does not apply to certain information to be provided by the 
paying agent under the so-called Savings Directive. 
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Additional grounds for refusal to provide information under the abovementioned Act are: 
 
- Article 1 and art. 13, par. 1 under a: a general prohibition of supplying of information in 
absence of an international obligation to exchange fiscal information, either under the Direc-
tive, , the Council of Europe/ OECD Convention on the Mutual Administrative Assistancein 
Tax Matters (1988 Strasbourg), or other provisions of international or interregional law. 
-  Article 13, par. 2  also includes an additional prohibition derived from the exception to the 
obligation to provide information in the OECD/EU Convention on the Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, in case the tax legislation in the other state is considered not to be 
in accordance with generally accepted standards of taxation, with a Tax Convention, or with 
the non discrimination principle regarding nationals in the same circumstances). 
   
Why were these choices between either including a possibility to refuse to provide informa-
tion, or a direct prohibition of doing so  made? 
The official explanatory note on the bill which led to the abovementioned Act as sent to Par-
liament does not in all cases provide clear reasons for this distinction  It generally refers to 
“international rules” (OECD rules, European rules). The prohibitive character of the ground 
based on “public order –” is explained by referring to the vital interests of the state being at 
stake there.  
Possibly a reason can also be found in the system of the abovementioned Dutch Act, in which 
the taxpayer is offered the possibility to lodge an appeal against the decision of the authorities 
to supply information. The groundsfor refusal for the states as included in the Directive or 
other agreements could in that context be functioning as legal grounds and arguments for the 
taxpayer to challenge the exchange in certain situations; in which situation it may be prefer-
able to create more clarity already in the Act itself. 
It could of course be argued that the prohibition to exchange information in  case measures 
should be taken which are not permitted in the national tax -law is the obvious thing  to do 
considering the importance of the principle of legality. 
Finally, as stated in the explanatory note to Parliament, the discretionary character of the ex-
ception in case of “professional secrets” provides the possibility to weigh the interests of the 
taxpayer against those of the state. 
 
Question 7) Between the Member States information can also be exchanged on the basis of 
double tax treaties. In some double tax treaties there are extensive information clauses (like in 
article 26 of the OECD model tax treaty) and in others petit information clauses.  
a) What kind of information clauses can be found in your country’s double tax 
treaties with the other Member States? In which of the double tax treaties are 
extensive information clauses and in which petit information clauses? (Please 
name for each double tax treaty with a Member State the kind of information 
clause that has been implemented.) 
b) In case there are extensive information clauses in the double tax treaties with 
some Member States and petit information clauses in the double tax treaties 
with other Member States please name the reasons for these distinctions. Is 
there a certain policy that defines with which countries what kind of informa-
tion clause is arranged? 
c) The revised article 26 of the 2006 version of the OECD model double tax 
treaty includes a new paragraph 5 that prohibits to refuse the provision of in-
formation just because the information is held by a bank, a trustee etc. Is the 
new article 26 included in any of your country’s double tax treaties? Do laws 
on bank secrecy exist in your country that make some information not obtain-
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able for your tax authorities? If so, please describe if there are situations in 
which the information can be obtained by the tax authorities anyway. 
 
Answer 7) 
a. Tax treaties containing an exchange of information article have been concluded with all 
Member States, except for Cyprus. 
These provisions generally follow the pattern of the OECD model, which is the “extensive” 
obligation (including the application of the tax treaty as such, as well as the application of the 
domestic laws of the treaty partners.)  
 
However, the treaties with the following countries do not explicitly refer to exchange in the 
context of the application of domestic law: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain. 
 
There are also Dutch Tax Conventions mentioning under the purposes of exchange of infor-
mation the application of domestic law as far as its concerns provisions against tax evasion.    
Furthermore, the treaties with the following countries have some kind of limitation with re-
spect to the exchange of information regarding to banks: Austria, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Spain. 
 
b. reasons: the reasons are not always made clear in the explanatory notes on the bills to ap-
prove treaties as sent the Parliament,  but if they are mentioned, occasionally reference is 
made to “the lack of knowledge from Dutch side on the (tax) legislation of the other country.” 
This may for instance be a reason in case of conventions with relatively “new” treaty partners. 
 
c. existence of tax treaties based on the 2006 version of OECD Model 
This type of provision is e.g. included in the recently concluded treaties with Bahrain (2008), 
Ghana (2008), Qatar (2008), United Kingdom (2008), United Arab Emirates (2007) and the 
protocol to the South Africa Treaty (2005). None of these is yet effective, but it is already 
known that the one with Ghane will be effective as from 1 January 2009. 
 
existence of bank-secrecy  
There are no laws in The Netherlands regarding bank secrecy and thus information held by 
banks can generally be obtained by the Dutch Tax Authorities. There is an instruction called 
“Voorschrift informatie banken” (Instruction information of banks, Decision of 18 March 
2002, nr. DGB2002/1499, Strct. Nr. 58, which describes in detail which procedure the tax 
authorities should follow to acquire information on third parties from banks (e.g. unless spe-
cific aspects of the investigation warrent to deviate, the tax authorities should first try to ac-
quire the information from the third persons themselves before approaching the bank; the kind 
of information; deadline for submitting the information by banks; type of information the 
banks should automatically provide; possibility to put series of questions; at which level of  
tax authorities specific types of questions should be set). 
 
Information regarding savings of residents of other EU Member States are automatically ex-
changed under the Council Directive of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the 
form of interest payments (2003/48/EC). 
 
Question 8) In the 2002 version of the OECD model double tax treaty a new article 27 on the 
assistance in the collection of taxes has been included. Did your country adopt in some of its 
double tax treaties a rule identical or similar to the new Art. 27 OECD? If so, in which of the 
double tax treaties can such a regulation be found? 
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Answer 8) Article 27 OECD Model Convention on assistance in thecollection of taxes. EU 
member states with which treaties have been concluded containing a provision similar to the 
new article 27 of the  OECD model are: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany (separate trea-
ty on mutual assistance in the recovery of taxes) Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg 
(separate Benelux treaty on the mutual assistance in the recovery of taxes), Poland, Portugal, 
and Sweden). 
 
Question 9) Has your country ratified the joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mu-
tual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters signed in Strasbourg on 25th January 1988? 
 
Answer 9) The Netherlands has ratified the Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters signed on 25 January 1988, by Act of 26 June 1996 
(Stb. 1996, 382) and it entered into force as regards the Netherlands on 17 July 1996, and be-
came effective from 1 January 1997. With respect to the Netherlands, the right was reserved: 
- not to provide assistance in case of other taxes than the ones levied on income, profit, capital 
gains and capital (incl. succession duties and gift tax) at the level of central government 
- not to provide assistance in the service of documents for all taxes. Statements were made as 
regards the possibility of notification of its residents or nationals  before transmitting informa-
tion and with respect to not allowing, as a general rule, the presence of foreign authorities in 
case of audits for social security. 
 
Question 10) In 2002 the OECD developed the “Model agreement on exchange of informa-
tion on tax matters”. The purpose of this model agreement is to serve as a basis for countries 
to conclude bilateral exchange of information agreements with third States considered as “tax 
havens”. What are your country’s criteria to declare another country as a “tax haven”? Did 
your country conduct negotiations with third States (“tax havens”) to adopt this OECD model 
agreement? Has your country concluded any bilateral or multilateral treaties on the exchange 
of information based on this model agreement? If so, please describe in which parts these 
treaties follow the model agreement and name the reasons for discrepancies if they exist. 
 
Answer 10) Mutual Agreement OECD Tax–havens 
In The Netherlands tax legislation there is no definition of the notion “tax haven”. Tax avoid-
ance schemes are combated with tailored measures or general concepts of abuse of law (fraus 
legis). There are no blacklists mentioning countries considered as low tax countries. It can be 
mentioned however, that in the context of the participation exemption in the Corporate In-
come Tax (articles 13, paragraph 10, and article 13a, paragraph 1b) the criterion for low taxa-
tion is set at less than 10% tax on a tax base as determined under Dutch tax law. There has 
also been case law of the Supreme Court expressing that the Irish corporate income tax rate of 
10% is reasonable (Hr 8 February 2002, nr. 36358, BNB 2002/118).  
We have understood that the list of “committed tax havens” as used by the OECD, has been 
taken into account when determining with which tax haven countries treaties regarding mu-
tual assistance in tax matters would be negotiated. 
 
Treaties along the lines of the 2002 OECD Model agreement on the exchange of information 
in Tax Matters were signed with Isle of Man (12 October 2005), , Jersey (20 June 2007) and 
Guernsey (25 April 2008).. Those agreements are generally  in line with the Model. The main 
deviation is that Art. 2 on jurisdiction is missing. 
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Question 11) Do rules exist in your country that oblige subsidiaries (e. g. in cases of transfer 
pricing issues) to provide information held by the parent company? If so, please describe what 
these rules look like and how they affect the (international) taxation. 
 
Answer 11) Obligation on subsidiaries to deliver information available at their foreign parent 
or foreign sister companies. 
Yes, such a provision exist in article 47a of the “Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen” 
(General Taxes Act), Act of 2 July 1959, Stb. 301, as amended. 
Article 47a imposes legal obligations to provide information on a company of which the capi-
tal is divided into shares and on any other body, in case this company is more than 50% 
owned by a non-resident (parent) company or non-resident individual or in case of any other 
body the decision power in that body is held by the non-resident company or individual. The 
obligation relates  to information or information carriers which are in the possession of that 
non-resident company or non-resident individual. This covers in fact non-resident parent 
companies and other bodies. 
The same applies in case two or more bodies or individuals of which at least one is not resi-
dent in The Netherlands, have concluded a mutual agreement of cooperation under which they 
hold such majority shareholding or can exercise such decision power. Also covered is the case 
where the information is in the possession of other non-resident companies or bodies in which 
the in the previous paragraph mentioned non-resident company or non-resident other body has 
reactively more than 50% interest or can exercise the decision power (related companies and 
bodies of the foreign parent). This covers in fact the non-resident subsidiaries and other bod-
ies, controlled by the foreign parent or other bodies (non-resident sister companies).  
 
As explicitly mentioned in the General Taxes Act, the company or the body upon which this 
obligation is imposed, cannot successfully claim that it cannot provide the information be-
cause the non-resident company or individual is not prepared or willing to provide the infor-
mation. 
 
An exception to article 47a applies in case the non-resident company or individual is a resi-
dent of an EU Member State, or of a country with which a tax treaty was concluded which 
contains an extended obligation  to exchange information  (see above). The Minister of Fi-
nance may however allow the tax inspector to apply article 47a if it appears that the informa-
tion cannot be acquired. 
 
Generally speaking the effect of this provision seems to be that relevant information held by 
the non-resident parent or individual needs to be supplied. But in the cases where other EU 
Member States or Treaty Partners are involved, the competent authorities for the exchange of 
information will take over and will ask the competent authorities of the other state to inter-
vene and to provide the requested information. If it cannot be acquired from the other EU 
Member State or Treaty partner, the requested company or body can be subject to the penal-
ties imposed on not providing requested information.  
 
We assume that this penalty provision can actually only be rightfully applied if sufficient in-
dications exist that the non-resident does indeed avail of the information requested. It can also 
be expected that it will not be necessary to invoke the provision in case of residents of EU 
Member States. We do not avail of information whether it has ever been applied in relation to 
EU Member States. 
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Question 12) With which of the Member States have bilateral treaties concerning legal assis-
tance on law regarding fiscal offences been concluded? What kind of exchange of information 
on tax crimes has been arranged in these treaties? How is this exchange organised? 
 
Answer 12) As far as we are aware, no specific bilateral treaties have been concluded with 
other European states, besides the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in criminal 
matters. 
 
Question 13) Has your country ratified the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters and its additional protocol in tax matters? What is the definition of tax 
fraud/tax crime/tax offence in your country? 
 
Answer 13) The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between 
Member States has been ratified by The Netherlands by Act of 18 March 2004, Stb 2004/106; 
also the Protocol of 16 October 2001 to that Convention has been ratified. 
 
With respect to the question about the definition of tax crime versus tax offence, the following 
can be mentioned. 
There is an elaborate enumeration in the “Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen” (General 
Taxes Act), Act of 2 July 1959, Stb. 301, as amended, of cases which are either considered to 
be an administrative offence (which are subdivided in categories of neglect in articles 67a-67c 
and in cases of willful default in article 67d-67f) or a criminal offence (articles 68-71; subdi-
vided in crimes which are the cases where imprisonment can be imposed and criminal of-
fences where this is not the case). In view of the detailed enumeration of cases which are con-
sidered as an administrative or criminal offence, it is not possible to give one short definition 
of each notion. To give you a bit better impression, the following illustration is provided of 
the kind of cases covered by each category. 
Examples of an administrative offence are: no or late filing of a tax return and no or late pay-
ment of tax  (Arts. 67a and c of the General Tax Act and Arts. 21, 23 and 24 of the Decree on 
administrative fines. 
Examples of what are considered as criminal offences are:  filing a formally incorrect tax re-
turn, providing the tax administration with incorrect information, maintaining falsified books 
and records, and failing to preserve books and records for a period of 7 years  (Arts, 68-70  of 
the General Tax Act). 
 
Question 14) What is the borderline between the application of administrative assistance on 
the basis of “tax treaties” and the administrative assistance on the basis of conventions for the 
assistance in criminal matters? In other words: When does your country see the necessity to 
stop the cooperation under tax treaties and continues the cooperation under treaties concern-
ing legal assistance on law regarding fiscal offences? 
 
Answer 14) This is a difficult question to answer since the borderline cannot always be clear-
ly defined and also the legislative history does not provide much clarity in this respect. 
Generally, the approach seems to be that as long as the person involved is being looked at as a 
regular taxpayer, the regular administrative procedures will be followed as expressed in the 
General Taxes Act (regular authority to put questions and to do fiscal investigations, without 
e.g. coercive measures like searching the private home, detention, or the right to remain si-
lent). If however, the person is considered to be a suspect of a criminal offence, that person 
has another legal position and then other penal law rules and procedures will be applied (Act 
on penal prosecution) and also conventions for the mutual assistance in criminal matters will 
be applied. 
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Question 15) How have the EU regulations influenced the design of the rules and practices in 
your country that should avoid tax fraud and tax circumvention? Please give examples and the 
state of the discussion in the scientific literature where possible and appropriate. 
 
Answer 15) We are not aware of cases where these instruments for administrative assistance 
created by the EU influenced the design of rules and practices that should avoid tax fraud and 
tax circumvention. 
As mentioned already under answer 11, article 47a of the General Taxes Act is not applied if 
the information can be acquired under EU instruments. We also point at the fact that not al-
lowing for certain tax benefits in cross border situations out of fear for tax avoidance seems 
not to be accepted as a justification for obstacles in the EU if the information could be ac-
quired e.g. under EU instruments (see answers under V, 3, hereafter). No doubt also the sav-
ings directive has had a great impact in combating tax fraud with savings. 
 
Question 16) Which legal foundations with the other Member States concerning the collec-
tion of taxes exist in your country? Are there this-related clauses in your country’s double tax 
treaties? If so, with which countries? 
 
Answer 16) The legal foundations regarding the cooperation with other countries in the re-
covery of tax claims regarding direct taxation are in the EU instruments referred to above un-
der question 1 and 2, the tax treaties and other specific treaties dealing with this matter and 
the Dutch laws dealing with recovery of tax claims and the mutual assistance in this matter. 
For an overview of the tax treaties which contain provisions in this respect reference is made 
to the answer under 8 above).  
 
 
III. Questions of use 
  
Questions of use in relation to domestic law 
 
Question 1) What activities are the tax officials generally authorized to use when assessing 
taxes in your country? Can the tax authorities request additional information from another 
person or institution than the taxpayer himself (e. g. banks, insurances or business partners)? 
If so, please name which other persons or institutions these are? What are the requirements to 
request them?  
 
Answer 1) Officials can ask questions, investigate books and documents, visit (but not 
search) at the premises of the taxpayer, or of his employer, his bank, associate or business-
partner, or everyone who has the legal obligation to keep books and records  
 
Question 2) What are the measures available if a requested party fails to supply information 
(e. g. fines, penalties etc.)? Are the same domestic measures available when your country’s 
tax administration has received a request for information from another State?  
 
Answer 2)  
If the requested party’s own tax liability is at stake (for national taxation) then in case of re-
fusal he can be punished by means of the so called reversion of the burden of proof. The tax 
inspector will assess the taxpayer  and the taxpayer has to prove that the assessment is too 
high. This is an unfavourable position  in Court.  
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In case a “third party” fails, he will get a fine, because there will be no assessment, and there-
fore there will be no use for the possibility to reverse the burden of proof. In special cases 
Civil Court can force the taxpayer to deliver the requested documents by charging a fine for 
every day the party refuses the documents.  
The same measures are available in case of a request for information from another State. 
 
Question 3) When your country’s tax administration as the requested State is not in the pos-
session of the requested information has the tax administration the legal right to change or 
adjust a question in order to improve the answers before forwarding the question to the tax-
payer or a third person/institution? 
 
Answer 3) No. In that case it has to turn to the requesting state, insofar the question is about a 
foreign tax assessment of a third (legal) person. Moreover:  the Netherlands competent au-
thorities do not forward the request for information directly to the taxpayer who has to pro-
vide the requested information (third party), but to the tax  official.  The Netherlands consider 
the request for information as secret. However, it is of course possible that the information in 
the request will trigger the  tax official to investigate the taxpayer concerned more deeply, and 
to extend the purpose of  the investigation to the Dutch tax liability of this, or even another 
person. The foreign request for information will then have the function of a signal.  
 
Question 4) Is the tax administration allowed to use the information obtained for the purpose 
of assisting another country in order to adjust the already assessed domestic tax? 
 
Answer 4) This depends of the situation: If the request of the other country would reveal facts 
that the  Netherlands tax  administration was not, or could not have been aware of at the time 
of the assessment, then  a new investigation could be started to “improve” the original as-
sessment, and even impose a fine. But this is not allowed when the facts were already known 
to him, or when he could have been aware of them, reasonably speaking.  
 
Question 5) In 2006 the OECD published the “Manual on the implementation of exchange of 
information provisions for tax purposes”. Does your country follow this manual? If not, 
please give reasons and describe where you see deficiencies in this manual. 
 
Answer 5) No, the Netherlands do not follow the manual as such. However, the international 
obligation is in accordance with the spirit of the manual implemented in domestic legislation, 
by rules of application, and by instructions (manuals) for different methods of exchanging 
information (i.g. the presence of foreign tax officials at tax investigations, simultaneous audits 
etc.). They are widely available for the tax officials who have to work with them. 
 
 
Questions of use in general 
   
Question 6) According to article 1 paragraph 1 of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC the ex-
change of information takes place between the “competent authorities” that are defined for 
each country in article 1 paragraph 5. What does the organisation of the exchange of informa-
tion from your country’s competent authority to the competent authority of the Member State 
that made a request look like? Which authorities and agencies are involved in answering the 
request? Do (administrative) rules exist that regulate how the organisation to answer a request 
has to be like? If so, what is their content?   
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Are there any differences in this organisation concerning the automatic exchange of informa-
tion according to article 3 of the Council Directive (77/799/EEC) or the spontaneous ex-
change of information according to article 4 of the Council Directive (77/799/EEC)?  
 
Answer 6) A) Organisation: supplying and receiving  of information on request  
 
Supplying information on request 
• The foreign request has to be sent to the competent authorities. These are  in a 
special central department of the Tax Administration, working under the 
shared responsibility of the Ministry of Finance (international aspects) and the 
Tax Administration (internal processes of information gathering). The Depart-
ment consists of about 20 officials, only a few of whom are entitled to sign the 
correspondence with the other states (answers and requests).  
- Answering a request: this is the responsibility of the Tax Administration in 
the different regions (the tax inspectors).  
- Rules: The competent authorities first scrutinize the incoming requests on the 
basis of the criteria of the international obligation (tax treaty or EC Directive):  
   -  the scope of this obligation (object and subject),  
   - observation of the principle of exhausting the own sources first,  
- existence of limitations to be taken into account, and which are already 
visible in this   stage  (reciprocity, risk in respect to public order, ) 
On the basis of our domesticl law:  
- does the domestic law enable the Netherlands to gather the requested 
 information,  
- is the request proportional in terms of  required efforts and expected results   
On practical issues:  
-  is the request comprehensible for the tax-administration?.  
 
• The request is sent to the tax region where it is to be answered, with an accom-
panying letter, stating the term of response. The tax-official in the field has to de-
cide for himself if, and what kind of, an investigation is needed. He can get in 
touch with the competent authorities, but not directly with his counter-part in the 
other country. He has to send his answer to the competent authority, which, after 
scrutinizing it, sends a prior notification to the taxpayer who delivered the infor-
mation. This taxpayer can enter into a discussion with the competent authorities, 
and even go to Court before the answer is sent to the other country, except when 
there is reason for a presumption of fraud. (See also part VI)  
From January 2009 on the role of the central competent authorities has been 
changed as far as European mutual assistance is involved. The responsibility for 
the quality and speed of this assistance is now put in the hands of the 13 Tax Re-
gions the Netherlands tax administration is divided in. One of the reasons for this 
reorganization is the desire to make international exchange of information less bu-
reaucratic.  
 
Receiving information on request 
• The foreign answer is sent to the central competent authorities, where it regis-
tered, judged globally and passed on to the tax inspector who had made the re-
quest. This tax inspector is asked to give feed back (by way of a standardized 
form) on the effectiveness of the answer. This feed-back however can sometimes 
be given only after a long period, in cases where the assessment as a result of the 
foreign evidence has been challenged  in Court. 
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B) Supplying and receiving information in automatic exchange 
 
supplying information 
The Netherlands has concluded so called Memoranda of Understanding with 10 Euro-
pean countries, primarily concerning information which is available in databases.  
However, may be differences in the size or scope of these databases in the countries 
involved (no factual reciprocity). In that case some of the categories are labelled as 
“spontaneous” information.   
For supplying the information to the different countries, the central ITC department of 
the Netherlands tax administration queries the databases, (e.g. wages and pensions) 
and the competent authorities send the results to the other states, using the OECD for-
mat.   
 
 receiving information : 
The data files received from the other country are sent to the competent authority, 
which after registration sends it to the ICT-department. There the files are read, and 
put to the disposal of the risk management department. After a process of weighing 
this information against other (domestic) information, decisions will be taken about 
what will be done with the data. There are three possibilities:  
- the most valuable information will be put into the computerized assessment system 
as one of the elements to establish the assessment of a taxpayer by the central com-
puter.(i.e. information about wages or pensions received from other countries).  
- other valuable information will be sent to the  regional risk management departments 
to work with it actively. There the information can serve as an indication that some in-
vestigation is needed on certain branches of commerce.   
- other information is put in a database, and made available to the tax  administration 
more as an accessory source of knowledge when the central computer has already de-
cided that a certain taxpayer has to be scrutinized by an individual tax official because 
of some other item.  
     
C) supplying and receiving information in spontaneous exchange.  
 
supplying information 
This is information without a request, but which is found by the tax officials in doing 
their regular work in assessing Dutch taxpayers, and which in their opinion may be of 
relevance for another state. So this information is “produced” by the tax officials, and 
sent by them to the competent authorities. There it is scrutinized along with the criteria 
of the applicable international and domestic law. Before it is sent to the other state, a 
notification is sent to the taxpayer the information came from (see part VI). This is in-
dividual information. From 2009 on this notification of the taxpayer/informant is done 
by the tax regions as far as European Member States are involved.   
 
receiving information 
Information received concerning individual Dutch taxpayers is sent to the central 
 competent authorities, where it is registered, judged globally and forwarded to the ap-
propriate tax region, with a standardized request for feed back about the result of the 
information.  
Information received in larger quantities is sent to the risk management department, 
where conclusions can be drawn regarding the possible existence of structural fraud –
or evasion patterns and supplementary investigations can be started.   
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The processes of exchange on request and spontaneous exchange are described in a 
Ministerial Decree containing the elements of the international rules applicable, the in-
struction for the tax official how to proceed in answering a request or to send in spon-
taneously information, or to work together with foreign officers in a investigation. 
 
Question 7) What do the administrative procedures in your country generally look like when 
the requested information is not in the hands of the requested authority? 
 
Answer 7) See above: the tax inspector decides whether it is necessary to ask questions to the 
taxpayer concerned, or refer the question  to another region for more information, or to inves-
tigate the books or even the premises of the taxpayer. 
 
Question 8) Do special bilateral treaties concerning the administrative assistance in tax mat-
ters exist that shorten this bureaucratic way of answering requests? If so, please name these 
treaties and describe how the bureaucratic way is arranged there. 
 
Answer 8) In the Regulation 1798/2003 about Mutual Assistance on VAT matters, the possi-
bility of decentralized competent authorities is created (on a regional level, or even on an in-
dividual level). However the competence to exchange information must always be assigned 
explicitly and formally. There is also the possibility that these tax officials visit each other’s 
offices to gather (VAT) information they need. The Netherlands are developing these methods 
in an experimental setting, with neighbouring countries. 
 
Question 9) What does the organisation of the exchange of information look like when the 
request is based on articles 5 et sqq. of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 Octo-
ber 2003 in the field of value added tax? Which authorities and agencies are involved in these 
cases? 
 
Answer 9) The Regulation obliges the Member States to establish a Central Liaison Office. 
There the requests and answers on VAT are processed  in the same way as described above 
(unless one or more individual tax officials have been specifically assigned to do this). The 
difference is however that the taxpayer is not notified previously of the fact that information 
coming from him is going to be sent abroad. 
 
Question 10) Which are the authorities and agencies that deal with incoming requests for 
recovery according to the “Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assis-
tance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures”? 
How is the collection organised in your country when a Member State requests for recovery? 
Is a judgement of a national court required to collect another Member State’s tax? 
 
Answer 10) A. regarding authorities and agencies and organization: 
In the Netherlands the assistance in the field of recovery is dealt with by a special unit of the 
central department of Competent Authorities.  
 
Involved are: a) central authorities, b) tax collectors of the regional offices, c) bailiffs or proc-
ess-servers of the Dutch Tax Administration, d) administrative service.  
Ad a) The special recovery–unit of the central competent authorities is responsible for receiv-
ing and administrating the requests, forwarding them to the regional tax collectors, inserting 
them in the general records of taxs debtors, monitoring the terms of dispatching, communica-
tion with the foreign central authorities if necessary.  
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Ad b) Tax collectors are responsible for starting the collection process similarly to the na-
tional cases, eventualy for enforcing measures, including notification of warrants for the exe-
cution, for the administation of (clearance) payments, for giving instructions to forward pay-
ments to the other state, for issuing declarations of irrecoverability of certain debts, for deci-
sions on requests for remission of (national) tax-debts.  
Ad c) the bailiffs are responsible for notification of the warrants, seizure of goods (conserva-
tory seizure) and the executing of goods.    
 
B. regarding whether a domestic judgement is required to collect for another Member State 
No. To collect another Member State’s tax the Netherlands tax administration does not re-
quire a judgement of a domestic judge. The title of execution from the foreign authorities is 
crucial. It must be added to the request. It is transformed in a warrant which can serve for the 
use of recovery by the Dutch tax-collector. 
 
Question 11) In case bilateral treaties concerning legal assistance on law regarding fiscal of-
fences exist: How is the exchange of this information organised in your country? 
 
Answer 11) As mentioned in answer 12 under chapter II of this report, no such specific bilat-
eral treaties have been concluded with other European Member States. Mutual assistance re-
garding fiscal offences is provided on the basis of a number of multilateral treaties, like the 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20.4.1959 with supple-
mentary Protocol of 17.3.1978, and the Schengen Implementation Agreement of 19.6.1990 as 
regards excises, VAT and customs duties. 
 
Question 12) According to opinions a request for information can only be based on one legal 
instrument. Does your country follow this or does it refer to all instruments available? What is 
the tax authorities’ opinion on conflicting rules in different instruments? What does the rela-
tionship between the double tax treaties and the Council Directive 77/799/EEC look like? 
Which is the preferred way to exchange information and why? 
 
Answer 12) No, the Netherlands do not follow the opinion that one legal basis has to be cho-
sen. Only the OECD-Council of Europe Convention of 1988 prescribes this choice. On the 
basis of that Convention Member States of the EU are obliged to choose for the Directive 
77/799. Neither this Directive itself, nor the OECD Model Convention prescribes this. 
In case of a conflict between a treaty–rule and EU–legislation in the Dutch viewEuropean 
rules have priority, on the basis of Art. 5 of the EC Treaty (obliging Member States to do the 
utmost to implement as faithfully as possible the aims of the European Treaty) along with 
article 234 of that EC Treaty (obliging the Member States to renegotiate previous conventions 
which are conflicting with European law). 
 The Netherlands do not see many differences in the scope of most of our treaties with that of 
the Council Directive, except in some “old” treaties concluded on the basis of the 1963 
Model.  So there  is no need to choose, except when the OECD- Council Convention is oblig-
ing  the Netherlands to do so. 
 
Question 13) Which precautions are taken in your country to make sure that no information 
containing commercial, industrial, business or professional secrets or details about commer-
cial processes are provided? 
 
Answer 13) This protection is (implicitly) included in the general confidentiality-rule of our  
domestic tax law, which is also applicable to the information received from other  
countries. Misuse of taxpayers’ information or failure in maintaining secrecy is 
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severely punished. In the case of international exchange, normally the taxpayer who has de-
livered information is notified previously that “his” information will be sent to another State. 
The taxpayer can object to this decision, e.g. because of commercial secrets being involved 
and he can even go to court to challenge the decision (see part VI). 
 
Question 14) Which precautions are taken in your country to guarantee that the information 
conveyed is kept confidential in the requesting Member State? 
 
Answer 14)  The Netherlands Minister of Finance is only allowed to establish obligations for 
mutual assistance in tax matters with countries possessing legislation on the subject of secrecy 
and confidentiality in tax matters (art. 14 of the Law on the mutual assistance in tax matters). 
But of course: there  the Netherlands (like any other country) have very much to put  trust in 
the integrity of the tax administration of the other countries. This can be risky in situations 
where a tax treaty  is mainly concluded because of economic reasons , while on the other hand  
there may be limited knowledge of and experience with the legislation in respect to rights and 
safeguards of the citizens in that country. In those cases the Netherlands may decide not to 
conclude a tax treaty or to establish a limited obligation to exchange information. With co-
Member States this is however not possible. On the other hand the Directive 1977/79 offers 
the requested state the possibility to ask for special measures for protection of his taxpayer, if 
that requested state is not sure about the level of protection in the requesting state.  Neverthe-
less there is always a risk there from the point of view of the protection of the taxpayer, espe-
cially because neither OECD nor the Council of Europe designed rules for establishing an 
obligation for mutual agreement procedures on state responsibility in cases of violation of this 
secrecy provisions. 
  
Question 15) How can in your country be guaranteed that only the persons or agencies named 
in article 16 of the “Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for 
the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures” have access 
to the documents and information given to your country by another Member State? 
 
Answer 15) See the answer to question 13. 
 
Question 16) Which precautions are taken in your country to ensure that the information 
stored in electronic data bases is treated confidentially as required in article 23 of the “Com-
mission Directive 2002/94/EC of 9 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for implement-
ing certain provisions of Council Directive 76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery 
of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures”? 
 
Answer 16) Encryption of the data bases, limited access, only for a special group of tax offi-
cials (including e.g. IT technicians working with the data). 
 
Question 17) Do the authorities of your country make investigations on their own when they 
are the requested authority or do they (just) work with the existing files?  
 
Answer 17) They make investigations of their own, when necessary. This is to be decided by 
the  tax administration. 
 
Question 18) On which occasions does your country take part in simultaneous tax examina-
tions? How often are permanent establishments in your country affected by a simultaneous tax 
examination? Do your country’s legal rules allow foreign tax officers to take part in tax ex-
aminations? 
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Answer 18) In the opinion of the Netherlands ’ tax authorities it is important that the tax ad-
ministration participates in simultaneous tax examination in cases where investigating a spe-
cific taxpayer would be very interesting for other countries as well: e.g. when the taxpayer is 
part of a multinational, or is belonging to a group of cooperating enterprises, or is a permanent 
establishment of an enterprise resident in another country, or is steady business partner of 
another (independent) enterprise resident in another country.  The Netherlands accepts to be 
nvolved in simultaneous tax examinations at the  request of other countries, if this is not con-
trary to the Netherlands’interest and participation  could attribute to the result aimed at by the 
requesting country. Simultaneous tax examinations are carried out several times a year, both 
at the Netlands’initiative as well as on request of other countries, and they are dealt with by a 
specific department responsible for the decision making and the carrying out of Dutch or for-
eign initiatives in this field.  
It is not known how often  permanent establishments situated in the Netherlands are affected 
by these simulataneous examinations. 
- Our legal rules allow foreign tax officers to take part in tax examinations, in the following 
cases, where:  
•    a considerable tax interest is involved 
• the matter is highly specific or complicated, and the presence of the foreign officer 
      would really be an extra help 
• when a real risk of tax evasion or fraud is present 
• under the condition of reciprocity.   
 
Question 19) Are there cases in which the usage of a certain kind of evidence is allowed 
though it is normally forbidden in your country just to make the mutual assistance easier? If 
so, please describe this kind of evidence and name reasons for the exception. 
 
Answer 19) No.  
 
Question 20) Is there a tendency in which situations the tax authorities use which kind of 
method (the exchange on request, the automatic exchange of information and the spontaneous 
exchange of information) to get the information they need? 
 
Answer 20) Use of either of these methods of exchange depends from the nature of the in-
formation needed.  The Netherlands try to improve the use of automatic exchange of informa-
tion, but the applicability of this method seems restricted to bulk information stored in data-
bases. Efforts are regularly made to improve the awareness of the existence of international 
risks with our tax officials, and to encourage them to ask questions to the treaty partners and 
other EU Member States in individual cases, and to improve the awarereness of the fact that 
books and records of taxpayers can contain information which can be of use for another coun-
try, and that in such cases the Netherlands are obliged to send this information to the other 
state. 
 
Question 21) How does the exchange of information influence the possible restrictions to the 
free movement of capital with third countries? 
 
Answer 21) It seems no harm is done by the exchange of information to the free movement of 
capital, as it contributes to taxes due being paid. States should be open and transparent regard-
ing their tax laws and even about their tax–incentives. It seems that in the opinion of the 
European Council and Commission and the OECD international transparency and exchange 
of tax information are the best ways to win the battle against harmful tax competition. If every 
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country observes this recommendation there will be a level playing field for the free move-
ment of capital. 
 
Question 22) What does the relationship and influence between criminal and tax proceedings 
and judgements in your country look like? 
 
Answer 22) We do not see the relevant of this question here, unless it is about the possibili-
ties for using information received by means of mutual exchange in tax matters in criminal 
proceedings. Dutch criminal Courts accept evidence from the tax administration. When it 
comes from abroad as a result of exchange of information in tax matters, it depends  on the 
secrecy-provision in the international rules if it can be used.  
 
Quantities and figures 
 
Question 23) How many requests from other Member States does your country get per year? 
How many requests to other Member States does your country make per year? How many 
spontaneous and automatic exchanges of information does your country transfer to the other 
Member States and how many of these exchanges of information does your country get per 
year? If possible, please give statistical figures of the last ten years. 
 
Answer 23) From the statistics available we could not conclude how often the Netherlands 
tax administration receives and makes requests in each particular year. The figures on  infor-
mation received in a particular year could also represent information relating to requests from 
previous years. This can also be the case for  information which is sent to other countries.   
In the tables below, you also find information under the heading “terms” with respect to the 
average time needed for exchanging the information both for the Netherlands and  for the 
other Member States. These are averages. No record is kept about each specific country, nor 
about  the different ways of exchange.   
The following data are related to direct taxes.  
 
Survey of supplied information 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Request. 373 451 475 582 658 1024 895   
Spont. 11.231 20.372 13.860 16.403 13.751 54.396 267   
Aut. 13.436 27.209 134.720 75.838 88.979 20.753 128.793   
Terms  7 
months 
6 
months 
6 
months 
6 
months 
7,5/7,7 
months 
7,5/7,5 
months 
6,6/6,8 
months 
  
 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
Request 983 1191 1553 
Spont. 1.615 4.932 764 
Aut. 593 177.243 280.145 
Terms 
 
7,5/8,0 
months 
6,5/8,6 
months 
6,1/7,1 
months 
 
Survey of received information 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Request. 9.26 1.302 1.537 1.633 1.450 1.035 1.142 
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Spont. 11.591 7.027 30.438 4.764 26.880 54.379 40.885 
Aut. 22.632 48.115 40.968 27.533 29.552 20.753 19.842 
Terms   8 
months 
3 
months 
3,5 
months 
3 
months 
4,5 / 9 
months 
3,6/8.2 
months 
4,9/6,8 
months 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
Request 818 743 793 
Spont. 7.535 34.189 40.403 
Aut. 190.078 144.851 318.788 
Terms 4,4/6,9 
months 
6,7/8,8 
months 
5,9/6,5 
months 
 
Since 2002 the time needed to exchange the information  is represented in two numbers, to 
make a distinction between two types of operational workflows being used by the Netherlands 
tax administration:  
- one is the normal one, by way of correspondence (letters with annexes),  
- the other is by way of short requests (and answers) by fax on matters such as VAT –
identification  or other requests that do not need special investigations in the requested coun-
tries, but only the consulting of databases. It is used for the struggle against volatile caroussel-
fraude structures. The latter is a speedy procedure, already known for more then 10 years, but 
only accounted for specifically from 2002.       
 
Question 24) How often does your country’s competent authority get information on basis of 
the “Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form 
of interest payments” per year? If possible, please give statistical figures of the last ten years. 
 
Answer 24) Please, see the answer on  question 5 in part IV. 
 
Question 25) Does your country request information more often from certain Member States 
than from the other Member States? Do certain Member States request more often informa-
tion than the other Member States? If so, please name these countries.  
 
Answer 25) From the statistic material available it is difficult to distinguish the exact volume 
of the exchange of information with each specific country. It is clear however that the highest 
intensity in information exchange is between the Netherlands and its direct neighbouring –
countries Belgium and Germany. Also France and the United Kingdom are important part-
ners. More then 90% of the exchange is with these countries.    
 
Question 26) How long does it take your country to answer a Member State’s request? How 
long does it take until a Member State answers your country’s requests? If possible, please 
name for both questions the number of requests that took under three months and that took 
over three months to answer or to be answered. Please give statistical figures of the last ten 
years. 
 
Answer 26) Please see the answer on question 23. 
 
Question 27) Do the incoming requests and the requests made by your country and the auto-
matically and spontaneously exchanged information mainly focus on certain types of direct 
taxes? If so, please name the tax type and the quantity of the requests. 
 
Answer 27) No specific information is available on this item. 
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Question 28) According to article 8 of the Council Directive (77/799/EEC) it is possible to 
refuse the provision of information. How often does your country refuse to answer incoming 
requests because of the reasons named in article 8 per year? How often do other Member 
States refuse to answer your requests because of the reasons named in article 8 per year? 
What is the most frequent reason to refuse the exchange of information? If possible, please 
give statistical figures of the last ten years. Are there any other instruments available in your 
country to refuse the provision of information? If so, please describe them.  
 
Answer 28) It hardly ever happens that requests are refused by the Netherlands. If one of the 
groundsfor refusal seems to be present, the Netherlands competent authorities are getting into 
contact with the other member States, and supplementary information is asked to make a fur-
ther judgement.        
 
Question 29) How many times per year does your country exchange information with other 
Member States on the basis of a double tax treaty? If possible, please give statistical figures of 
the last ten years. 
 
Answer 29) As the Netherlands will generally choose as wide a legal basis for the exchange 
of information as is available, (which can go up to three legal basis) there is  no distinction 
made in the statistics on that item. 
 
 
IV. Questions of efficiency of the mutual assistance in tax affairs  
 
Question 1) It was the Council Directive’s (77/799/EEC) aim to reduce tax evasion and tax 
avoidance across the frontiers of Member States by strengthening the collaboration between 
the Member States. Comparing the exchange on request, the automatic exchange of informa-
tion and the spontaneous exchange of information: Do you think one of them is more efficient 
to achieve these aims than the others. If so, please give reasons for your opinion. 
 
Answer 1) It depends on the kind of information, the purpose of the request and the way it 
can be handled both by the requesting country and the country giving the information. For 
example, automatic exchange of information might be more efficient for bulk information 
which can be easily handled and processed by computers in both states, for example interest 
received (at a domestic  level, in the Netherlands banks have to give automatically informa-
tion on  the amounts held on accounts and interest received by individuals, which seems to 
work quite efficient because this process is highly computerized). In 2007 391,000 data were 
automatically exchanged and 451,000 data were automatically received.4  
However, the setting up of suitable databases and computer systems in order to make the data 
available to tax inspectors requires a lot of initial investments and can be difficult.  Fitting in 
the received bulk information in a process of  (computerized) assessment of taxpayers can be 
difficult for reasons of timing. The Dutch experience is that the foreign records often come 
too late for being embedded in this procedure, and so the use of it requires special efforts. 
If information requested is more specific, more ‘made-to-measure’ or aimed at a relatively 
small group of tax payers, or if the software both states use to handle the information is not 
compatible, or if the systems of one of the states cannot handle bulk information, exchange on 
request is probably more efficient to ensure the requesting country gets the information it 
                                                 
4 Report of the Dutch tax authorities 2007, p. 29  http://www.minfin.nl/dsresource?objectid=48127&type=pdf . 
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needs. For example, information for which the Dutch tax authorities have to investigate the 
administration of the tax payer is not suitable for automatic exchange of information. 
 
The following table gives an overview of the number of cases of mutual assistance on request 
in which the Netherlands was involved:5 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Information provided by the Nether-
lands  
2872 1822 3815 3999 
Information received by the Nether-
lands 
2473 2457 3386 2844 
 
Question 2) In case in your country a taxable person has larger or more duties to cooperate 
when the facts and circumstances affect a foreign country (cp. question V.2): Do you think 
they are more efficient to reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance than the possibilities to ex-
change information given by the Council Directive 77/799/EEC or the other instruments of 
cross-border information exchange? 
 
Answer 2) As the duties to cooperate in domestic situations are already quite broad, the duties 
to cooperate when the facts and circumstances affect a foreign country are similar.  
Duties of cooperation normally will relate  to situations in which fiscal authorities of a State 
want to assess the tax liability of its taxpayer. In cases of cross border income, the information 
which is given by the taxpayer cannot be fully controlled or checked, no matter how heavy the 
domestic cooperation-duties are. A request for information to the other Member State or 
treaty partner will then be the (necessary) supplement, the missing part of the puzzle.  
 
Many times, the Dutch tax authorities do not request information from the tax payer himself, 
but from a third person obliged to maintain books and records (for example, companies and 
employers). Such persons have very broad information obligations regarding the taxation of 
third persons as well under Dutch law. However, where in national situations such persons 
have broad obligations to automatically pass on information to the tax authorities, in interna-
tional situations such obligations are limited to interest from savings. 
 
Question 3) Do you see any differences in the efficiency to reduce tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance between the double tax treaties and the relevant Council Directives? If so, can you say 
what these differences are and where they result from? 
 
Answer 3) In general the Council Directives give more possibilities to exchange information 
than existing bilateral tax treaties. A few examples: 
 
a) Exchange of information based on double tax treaties is only possible insofar as this is nec-
essary for carrying out the provisions of the treaty or/and the domestic laws of the contracting 
states concerning taxes covered by the convention. Such taxes are usually limited to only 
taxes on income and capital. 
Other taxes are not covered in many existing bilateral tax treaties. On the other hand, gift and 
inheritance taxes  are not covered in the Directives, but in the bilateral tax treaties regarding 
these taxes (only a few in the case of the Netherlands) usually an exchange of information 
clause is included. Since the 2000 version of article 26 of the OECD- Model Convention on 
income and on capital, in some more recent treaties the possibility to exchange information is 
                                                 
5 Report of the Dutch tax authorities 2007, p. 29  http://www.minfin.nl/dsresource?objectid=48127&type=pdf . 
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broadened to all domestic taxes (for example all taxes are included in the tax treaty with 
South Africa (2005), Slovenia and Albania, but not in South Africa (1971) and the recently 
concluded treaty with Saudi Arabia). 
“Efficiency“ relates to the aim for the Conventions or Directives or Regulations, which are 
more or less specific. The obligations for the supplying states do not differ a great deal.  
 
b) Under the Council Directives information may be used for other purposes than taxation if 
the other state allows this and the other state also allows this in its own laws. This is not the 
case in many Dutch tax treaties. Some Dutch tax treaties with a limited exchange of informa-
tion clause include the option to request information for the purpose of imposing national leg-
islation provided the information is used to prevent fraud. 
 
c) In most tax treaties it is allowed to disclose the information in public court proceedings, 
whereas under the Council Directives this is only possible if the other state does not object to 
such disclosure. This might be an incentive for some member states to exchange more infor-
mation under the Directive than under a tax treaty. 
 
However, from an efficiency perspective one may wonder whether it is generally more effi-
cient to have more possibilities to exchange information. For example, if countries would ex-
change a lot of information automatically and/ or spontaneously, whereas their internal or-
ganization and resources are insufficient to cope with this, such increase might lead to an in-
formation overload which might not be efficient in combating tax evasion. 
 
Finally, tax treaties  based on the OECD Model Tax Convention 2008 may provide for more 
possibilities to exchange information than the Directive, as the new paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
article 26 provide that, notwithstanding the exceptions in paragraph 3 (for example, regarding 
business secrets) a lack of domestic tax interest ,domestic bank secrecy rules or the fact that 
the information relates to ownerships interests in a person do not limit the obligation to ex-
change information. 
 
Question 4) How efficient is the exchange of information via the electronic database VIES as 
regulated in articles 22 et sqq. of the “Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 October 
2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax”? Which potential prob-
lems do you see and which problems already did occur when using VIES? 
 
Answer 4) When this Directive was published, it was expected that it would make the fight 
against tax evasion more efficient, as it would extend the possibilities to exchange and to use 
information, it would partly remove bureaucratic hurdles and it would enforce more commit-
ment of the member states.6 Furthermore, as it includes time limits, it will probably result in 
more timely exchange of information. There is no research known to us on the effectiveness 
of the system.  
 
Question 5) How efficient is the exchange of information as regulated in articles 8 and 9 of 
the “Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form 
of interest payments” in your opinion? Did any problems occur? Which potential problems do 
you see? 
 
Answer 5) Although no information is available on the costs of this exchange of information 
and information regarding the comprehensiveness of the data is lacking, which precludes a 
                                                 
6 Editors of Vakstudie Nieuws in VN 2003/57.23. 
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final judgement, we have the impression that this type of exchange is quite efficient . In an-
swer to questions of members of Parliament the Dutch undersecretary of Finance stated in the 
summer of 2007 that that the Netherlands received about 96.000 data concerning payments of 
interest in the second half of 2005.7 About 4000 data were incomplete which made it impossi-
ble to identify the receiver of the interest. These data were returned to the country of origin. 
The other data were used in the tax assessments. In 2007, again most information was ex-
changed because of the Savings Directive: 207,000 data on interest payments to 33 countries 
were exchanged and 165,000 data from 31 countries were received.8 These numbers are in-
cluded in the total numbers of data exchanged automatically as mentioned under answer 1 of 
this part IV above, relating to 2007. Taking into account that only about 2,4% of this large 
bulk of information could not be used, it seems that this automatic exchange of information 
seems to be relatively efficient. 
 
Question 6) How efficient is any kind of the exchange of information to avoid tax frauds and 
connected problems in the EU? 
 
Answer 6) We do not have information on the costs of exchange of information, but ex-
change of information seems to have contributed to an improvement of the taxation of such 
income. Successes have been reported by the tax authorities in the Netherlands especially in 
relation to spontaneous information e.g. from a large quantity of spontaneous information on 
bank accounts held by Dutch taxpayers in German banks.  This resulted in assessments of 
many millions of Euro’s in total. Also automatic exchange of information from Belgium con-
cerning pensions and salaries, and the cooperation by means of simultaneous audits seem to 
have been successful. Furthermore, the fact that the media have reported on spontaneous ex-
change of information regarding bank accounts held in Luxembourg (information exchanged 
by Belgium) and Liechtenstein (information exchanged by Germany) has probably caused 
many tax payers to voluntarily report bank accounts which they previously did not report (the 
usual fine for not reporting bank accounts did not apply in these cases of voluntary reporting). 
Since 2001 the Dutch tax authorities received an additional amount of tax of almost EUR 135 
million of about 4500 individuals who reported their savings or other wealth held abroad. In 
2007 the tax authorities received  an additional amount of tax of almost EUR 21 million of 
almost 350 individuals. The fact that tax payers are more aware that information may be and 
will be exchanged might therefore in itself result in less attempts to avoid taxation.9 There 
also have been reported results from automatic exchange of information on Belgian pensions 
and wages in 2004. For the individual requests of ionformation there is no routine of reporting 
of results developed yet.    
 
Question 7) Article 8 of the “Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments” enumerates the information that the paying 
agent has to report to the competent authority of the Member State where the beneficial owner 
is resident. Do you think this minimum amount of information named in article 8 is sufficient 
to ensure effective taxation of savings income? If not, which additional information would be 
necessary in your opinion? 
 
Answer 7) It seems to be sufficient for the Netherlands as long as the country of origin does 
not omit information (please refer to the answer on question 5). However, the fact that the 
                                                 
7 Letter to the Second chamber dated 4 June 2007, DGB 2007-02235M, page 11 and Report of the Dutch tax 
authorities 2006 
http://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/beheersverslag_belastingdienst_2006.pdf . 
8 Report of the Dutch tax authorities 2007, p. 28  http://www.minfin.nl/dsresource?objectid=48127&type=pdf . 
9 Report of the Dutch tax authorities 2007, p. 28  http://www.minfin.nl/dsresource?objectid=48127&type=pdf . 
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systems for exchange of information are effective, does not mean that the Directive is per-
ceived to be effective as it only includes savings of which individuals are the beneficial owner 
and several products which are perceived to be similar to savings are not included. Thus the 
level of exchange of information does not seem to limit the effectiveness of the Directive, but 
rather its scope. 
 
Question 8) Do you see possibilities to amend the way information is exchanged on basis of 
the “Council Directive 2003/48/EC of June 2003” to ensure effective taxation of savings in-
come and to remove undesirable distortions of competition? If so, please describe what these 
amendments may look like. 
 
Answer 8) It seems to work well for the Netherlands, however, as mentioned under 7, the 
limited scope of the Directive is perceived to limit the effectiveness of the Directive. 
 
In any case, the regular increase of taxes flowing from the application of this Directive will be 
only a one- time matter. Once the “startling effect” of the Directive is over, and the compli-
ance of the taxpayer is improved, the results will structurally stabilize, hopefully on a higher 
level then before.  
 
Question 9) One of the problems of the mutual assistance in tax affairs between the Member 
States may be that misunderstandings occur because of the different languages involved. 
What do you think the linguistic quality of the information given to your country is mainly 
like? (“understandable in a good and easy way” or “understandable in bad way”) How much 
of the information your country gets per year is understandable in a bad way? If possible, 
please give statistical figures of the last five years. 
 
Answer 9) This is not perceived as an issue in the Netherlands. The Netherlands competent 
authorities have a translating department (for French, Spanish and German) in case the Dutch 
tax officials would not understand these languages. However, translating is time consuming. 
The language problem could be solved if the EU would adopt English as the common lan-
guage for the exchange of information and the various non-native English countries would be 
prepared to improve the level of English language skills throughout the relevant positions in 
the  tax administration, but this is obviously a sensitive issue.  
 
Question 10) How many times per year do you have to address additional or further enquiries 
concerning information already given by a Member State? How many times per year does a 
Member State make additional or further requests concerning information your country has 
already given to that Member State? 
 
Answer 10) The only information available dates from the years 1994 and 1995.10 In those 
years the Dutch tax authorities received all information which was requested from other 
member states.  
 
In 1994 the Dutch tax authorities did not comply with seven requests and in 1995 with five 
requests. The main reasons for not complying with the request were the lack of juridical basis 
for the exchange of information, the requesting authority not being authorized to request the 
information and the fact that the requested information was not available.  
                                                 
10 Joint research of the National Audit Offices of 12 member states of the European Union on mutual assistance 
regarding direct taxes, report on the Netherlands (October 2007). 
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We have understood that additional requests are rarely made, sometimes they have been made 
as a reminder regarding a pending requestor as a result of  new developments which had taken 
place in the requesting country.   
 
Question 11) Are there any differences between the Member States concerning the quality of 
the answers your country gets?  What do you think the reasons (e. g. differences in the mate-
rial domestic tax law, administrative tax law or bank secrecies) for these problems are? 
 
Answer 11) No information available, but it seems likely that the various relevant factors 
determining the possibilities to effectively cooperate in this area are different amongst the 
countries concerned. 
 
Question 12) Do you think the official channels of answering incoming requests are reason-
able or do you think they are too circumstantial? 
 
Answer 12) The official channels seem to work reasonably well, but using them is often felt 
by tax officials as too time-consuming, especially in the field of direct taxes, where no Euro-
pean computernetwork (CNN) is in operation. If such system would be developed for direct 
taxes as well, loss of time by the written procedure could be avoided. 
Perhaps the solution of the Regulation 1798/2003 could be adopted for the Directive as well. 
On the other hand: also Member States  could perhaps themselves make greater efforts to im-
prove the speed of the internal contacts between the central Competent Authorities and their 
tax officials in the field, this of course without jeopardizing  the protection of the rights of 
citizens/taxpayers. On the other hand: the issue of speed should not be overstressed. Recently 
the Netherlands tax authorities have started a pilot with the neighbouring regions of countries 
Belgium and Germany in which the function of competent authoritiy to exchange information 
is decentralised in order to reduce delays and misunderstandings caused by communication 
over different levels and to have more direct communication between the officials asking and 
collecting the information. 
 
Question 13) Do you think there are any possibilities to make the mutual tax exchange easier 
and quicker? What would they be? 
 
Answer 13) In 1992 on average it took the Dutch tax authorities 13.6 months to answer a re-
quest. In 1995 this was reduced to 6.6 months.11 This turned out to be the average period for 
our treaty partners as well (internal data from the Dutch Competent Authorities). The tax au-
thorities informed the National Audit offices that the time was not too long from the perspec-
tive of the time period beyond which the tax authorities would loose the right to assess the tax 
liability under domestic law. However, it is a continuous process of improvement and it is 
hoped that the process of decentralisation of the exchange process will decrease bureaucratic 
delays (as would use of English and in case of some countries improvement of English lan-
guage skills). It is standard procedure that the Dutch tax authorities send a reminder to the 
foreign authorities after six months have passed since the request was lodged. In special cases 
the reminder is sent at an earlier date, if necessary within two months. In those cases the rea-
sons are mentioned why the request is urgent. 
 
Question 14) According to article 18 of the “Commission Directive 2002/94/EC of 9 Decem-
ber 2002” a Member State should inform the other Member State immediately if a request for 
recovery or precautionary measures becomes devoid of purpose as a result of payment of the 
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claim or of its cancellation for any other reasons or if the claims’ amount changed. What are 
the experiences with this rule in your country? How well does the exchange of this kind of 
information between the Member States work in your opinion? 
 
Answer 14) No information available. 
 
Question 15) According to article 11 of the “Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 
1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes 
and other measures” the requested authority has to inform the applicant authority immediately 
about all of the measures taken that concern the request for recovery. Do you think that the 
exchange of information meets these requirements in practice? 
 
Answer 15) We do not avail of any information regarding this issue. 
 
Question 16) How effective is the “European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Crime 
Matters” to solve cases that affect tax crimes in your opinion? 
 
Answer 16)  The scope of such assistance is more limited since there has to be a criminal tax 
case, whereas regular exchange of information requests can also be lodged if there is not (yet) 
a criminal tax case. In case of assistance in criminal cases, the protection of the legal position 
of the person concerned is also stricter. On the other hand, the scope of the exchange of in-
formation under the Penal Code is broader: it has no exhaustive list of taxes regarding which 
information can be requested. Also for an exchange of information under the Dutch Penal 
Code, the fact concerned does not have to be an offence in the Netherlands, unless a request is 
made for the seizure of documentary evidence. Also the way of gathering the information can 
be more effective in criminal tax cases. There are the instruments of searching of houses and 
premises, and seizure of goods which can serve as evidence. On the other hand the taxpayer 
involved has the right to remain silent. 
 
The following table gives an overview of requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters in 
which the Netherlands was involved:12 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Foreign requests for assistance  162 148 235 236 
Dutch requests for assistance 798 958 1067 1409 
Completed foreign requests 226 225 203 174 
 
 
Question 17) How effective are common audits to inhibit tax avoidance and to solve cases 
that affect tax crimes in your opinion? 
 
Answer 17)  
In the Report of the Dutch tax authorities 2006 (p. 27) it is mentioned that following an in-
quiry of Parliament regarding fraud in the building sector, the tax authorities started extra au-
dits in this sector and related sectors like property developers . Since the start of this project, 
783 audits were started of which 640 have been completed. These audits resulted in an 
amount of tax retrieved of about 147 million Euro. Furthermore 52 possible instances of fraud 
have been reported, which resulted in a criminal inquiry. Generally speaking: tax audits cer-
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tainly can be effective, but as they are time consuming, the problem is to pick the “right” per-
sons or enterprises. This is a matter of risk–analysis.  
 
The Dutch tax authorities aim to have more simultaneous audits with other member states as 
these are perceived to be effective by them. In 2007 the Netherlands participated in 28 of such 
audits. 13 
 
Question 18) Are there any national reforms to facilitate the usage of evidence held by banks 
or other institutions in the tax procedure? 
 
Answer 18) The are no reforms necessary as regards the use of information held by banks in  
the tax procedures.  Already currently the tax authorities have very broad powers to demand 
information from banks . In the context of the regular assessment process, banks are obliged 
to automatically give information on accounts to the tax authorities and can be obliged to give 
information on request, in case of foreign requests. This information can subsequently be used 
for the purposes of tax procedures. Reference is also made to answer 13 under part VI of this 
report. 
 
Question 19) How efficient is in your opinion the collection of taxes as regulated in the 
Council Directive 76/308/EEC, on the basis of double tax treaties and on basis of bilateral 
treaties if they exist? If possible, please name reasons for differences in the efficiency be-
tween these different legal foundations. How efficient is the “Council of Europe/OECD Con-
vention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters” here? 
 
Answer 19) In a Decree of 6 April 2006 the Dutch undersecretary of Finance stated that the 
tax authorities are obliged to first use the domestic means and instruments to obtain informa-
tion.14 If it is not possible to get the information using the domestic instruments a request 
based on bilateral tax treaties or on the European Directive will be made. However, if the in-
quiry would be jeopardized by attempts to get the information in the Netherlands or if this 
would take much more effort, a request for exchange of information can be lodged without 
first using the domestic regulations. This policy seems to indicate that there are cases in which 
it is more efficient to use international regulations than domestic regulations.   
The Dutch tax authorities may use the regulation which gives most possibilities to obtain the 
information.15 The Netherlands only concluded one bilateral treaty with Germany just for the 
purpose of mutual assistance in colletion of taxes. Furthermore assistance is provided on the 
basis of article 27 of (some) tax treaties or on the basis of the Directive 1976/308 EEC or the 
Council of Europe/OECD Convention. There is no difference in the efficiency of the assis-
tance provided on these legal foundations.  
 
Question 20) Do you see the reasons why foreign tax administrations fail to supply informa-
tion? 
 
Answer 20) The most common reason is probably that certain information is not available, or 
that it turns out to be too burdensome for the requested state to acquire the information. It is 
difficult to establish the fact of “failure”, because when a Member State invokes one of the 
arguments of article 8 of the Directive, or of article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, 
this is not “failure” but just a choice the other country is entitled to make.  Differences in tax 
law may result in the fact that certain information is not collected by a country, because it is 
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not relevant for assessing the tax liability under the legislation of that country. However, as of 
2006 this should not be a valid reason anymore for countries which concluded a tax treaty to 
fail to supply information. 
 
 
V. Questions of burden of proof 
 
Question 1) Who does generally bear the burden of proof in your country when relevant evi-
dence for the taxation is concerned? 
 
Answer 1)  In tax cases the Netherlands uses the so-called doctrine of “free distribution of 
proof”: the party which is in the best circumstances to proof something has to provide the 
evidence. In general, this means that the burden of proof regarding items resulting in a reduc-
tion of tax, like deductions and exemptions rests with the tax payer and the burden of proof 
regarding items resulting in an increase of tax rest with the tax inspector. However, if a tax 
payer does not fulfil his obligations towards the tax authorities, for example he does not give 
information upon request, the full burden of proof may shift to the tax payer. This means that 
the tax inspector no longer has to prove items which increase the tax, but that the tax payer 
has to proof that these items did not occur. This is a very heavy burden of proof and the tax 
payer many times fails to meet it. 
 
Question 2) Has your national tax system special or different rules for tax-relevant transac-
tions that affect a foreign country compared to tax-relevant transactions that only affect the 
home country when it comes to duties to cooperate? 
 
a) Does a taxable person have larger or more duties to cooperate when the facts and circum-
stances affect a foreign country? If so, please name and illustrate them. Do they influence the 
law of evidence? What are the legal consequences when the taxable person doesn’t meet the 
enlarged duties to cooperate? Who does bear the risk if relevant evidence is missing? 
 
b) What does the relationship between the enlarged duties to cooperate and the mutual assis-
tance in the European Union in your country look like? E. g.: Is a taxable person asked to 
meet the enlarged duties to cooperate first before the competent authority of your country 
requests the competent authority of another Member State to forward information on the basis 
of the Council Directive (77/799/EEC)? Are the enlarged duties to cooperate used without 
using the possibilities to exchange information on the basis of the Council Directive 
(77/799/EEC) (additionally)? 
 
Answer 2) Generally, the duties to cooperate in providing information are the same. As you 
can see in the answers under a) and b), some differences exist as regards the duties to cooper-
ate or the possible penalties in situations involving another country. 
 
a) there are no additional duties to cooperate if information is involved which is of importance 
to the levying of taxes by another country. There is a difference in the position of the 
taxpayer/informant,  in case there is no cooperation. Since in case of a foreign tax interest, 
there is no assessment in the Netherlands involved, the before mentioned possibility of rever-
sal of the full burden of the proof to a taxpayer who does not cooperate is not possible. In that 
situation recourse needs to be taken to fines, like in domestic cases, in certain circumstances. 
More effective is to acquire an order to provide the information from a civil court with a pen-
alty imposed on a periodic basis in case of continued non-compliance.  
As regards the situation where information is needed for Dutch tax purposes which is held 
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abroad, or which relates to income which is derived from abroad , reference is made to the 
answers 3 and 11 under chapter II dealing with the longer period available to tax authorities 
to make additional assessments (which is now challenged at the ECJ) and the specific coop-
eration required from a company if information is held abroad by parent- or sister-companies 
or other bodies. 
 
b) generally speaking not relevant in the Dutch situation in view of the answer under a). In 
case of the last mentioned issue of increased cooperation duties if information is held abroad 
by parent- or sister-companies or other bodies, an exception to the obligation is made in case 
the related group company or other related body is resident in an EU Member State or a coun-
try with which a tax treaty was concluded containing a satisfactory provision on exchange of 
information. However, if it turns out that the information cannot be acquired via the official 
exchange of 
information, the extended obligation may be applied (see answer 11 under Chapter II). 
 
Question 3) In various European Court of Justice procedures in tax matters Member States 
tried to justify an unequal treatment or regulation between facts and circumstances that affect 
a foreign country and the ones that affect the home country e. g. with a lack of control (cp. 
law suit “Danner” C-136/00). In general the European Court of Justice doesn’t accept this and 
similar reasons because of the existence of the “Council Directive 77/799/EEC” which would 
allow each Member State to get the relevant information that is necessary for a correct as-
sessment of taxes. Did this European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction concerning the exchange 
of information between the Member States change the burden of proof in your country? If so, 
please describe how.  
 
Answer 3) No. 
 
VI. Questions of legal protection 
 
Taxable persons have in most jurisdictions certain rights in the situation of an information 
exchange. Describe the legal rights of a taxpayer affected by an information exchange.  
 
Legal protection against incoming requests 
 
Question 1) What kind of legal protection does exist for the taxable person if another Mem-
ber State makes a request concerning him or her? Does he or she get to know that a Member 
State made a request concerning him? 
 
Answer 1) The taxpayer about whom a request is made by another state may be in two differ-
ent positions:  
The person is probably liable to taxes in the requesting state, and the request may serve to 
conclude if this is true. But in the requested state the person is in the position of the “infor-
mant”, the person who has to provide the information meant for the other state. If the re-
quested state is the Netherlands, this person will be notified of the fact that the tax authorities 
intend to supply information to the other state. This will be done after the requested informa-
tion has been gathered.. In normal cases (where no fraud is suspected) this notification is 
given before the information is supplied to the requesting state.  
However, since the coming into force of  Regulation 1798/2003 about VAT –assistance,  this 
previous notification included in the Act on the international assistance in the levying of taxes 
is abolished for the supplying of information of European VAT. 
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Question 2) Does there have to be a hearing before information concerning him or her is 
transferred to another Member State? Does provisional/temporary legal protection exist in 
these cases? 
 
Answer 2) The notification is in writing, and the taxpayer is entitled to a hearing, if the per-
son so wishes. This hearing has to take place before the decision to actually supply the infor-
mation is taken. 
 
Question 3) Does the taxable person have the right to bar the requested state from giving fis-
cal information concerning him or her to another Member State? 
 
Answer 3) After having worked with the fiscal authorities on the gathering of the requested 
information, the informant  receives a notification of the decision of the competent authorities 
to supply information to the other state. The person can object to this decision on the basis of 
the groundsincorporated in the relevant international law for states to refuse to provide the 
information (e.g. since the information is not falling within the scope of the tax reaty, or of the 
Directive, or since the way the gathering of the information has taken place was not in accor-
dance with to our domestic law, since there is no reciprocity, since the information is not cor-
rect, or since there is a business or professional secret at stake, so that the person will suffer 
damage if the information is provided. The competent authorities weigh the interests of the 
receiving state and of the taxpayer (and the Netherlands State) against each other, and take a 
final decision. 
 
Question 4) Has an objection a suspending effect? Has the taxable person the right to appeal 
and has an appeal any suspending effects? 
 
Answer 4) The taxpayer has a period of 10 days after having received the notification, to de-
cide whether an objection is made. After this 10 days’ period the taxpayer can only postpone 
the supplying of information by requesting the Court to decide in a speedy procedure on the 
grounds of the objection , because the taxpayer expects to suffer damages, should the infor-
mation be supplied.      
 
Legal protection against making a request 
 
Question 5) What kind of legal protection does exist for the taxable person in cases where his 
or hers country of residence intends to request another Member State about his or hers fiscal 
situation in this Member State? Does the taxable person get informed about this intention and 
does there have to be a consultation with the taxable person? 
 
Answer 5) In the Netherlands there is no special protection  for this. The inspector has the 
competence  to address the other state. However, normally  questions will first be  asked or 
investigations undertaken at the level of the  taxpayer himself, or another Dutch taxpayer, 
before the other country is involved, (except in the case this exhaustion of national sources –
principle would harm the result).  
 
Question 6) Does the taxable person have the right to bar his or hers country of residence 
from requesting a Member State concerning him or her? Does provisional/temporary legal 
protection exist in these cases? 
 
Answer 6)  In the Netherlands this is not possible. 
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Question 7) Has an objection a suspending effect? Has the taxable person the right to appeal 
and has an appeal any suspending effects? 
 
Answer 7) No. See at answer 6 above. 
  
Legal protection in general 
 
Question 8) Did this kind of legal protection exist before the Council Directive 77/799/EEC 
was implemented or has it been developed as a consequence of the implementation? Did the 
Council Directive 2004/56/EC bring any amendments in domestic law concerning this topic? 
 
Answer 8) The Netherlands Act on the international assistance in the levying of taxesdates 
from 1986, and was meant to implement both the Directive and the bilateral (OECD) treaties 
on that point. 
Council Directive 2004/56/EC did not bring any amendments in domestic law concerning this 
topic, but the Regulation 1798/2003 on VAT-assistance did. See above under answer 1. 
 
Question 9) If the information can be obtained from a third person or institution (e. g. insur-
ance company, business partner) does that person or institution have any specific rights? 
 
Answer 9) These (legal) persons are considered as the parties who had to deliver the informa-
tion which is meant for the other State, (they are the so-called informants) and so normally 
they will receive the previous notification, and have the rights of objection and appeal. 
 
Question 10) Is the taxpayer also protected by human rights treaties? If so, please describe 
what this protection looks like. 
 
Answer 10) Yes the taxpayer/informant is protected by human rights legislation on privacy. 
Although no mention is made of it explicitly in the  Act on the international assistance in the 
levying of taxes, the previous notification and the rights originating from it are very much in 
line with the principles of openness and participation established in the European Data Con-
vention (1981) and the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow 
of Personal Data (1981), as well as in article 8 of the European Human Rights Convention, 
(all resulting in 1995 in the “Privacy Directive”). They are also coherent with the more gen-
eral principles and ideas about the relationship between the State and its citizens from which 
the European legal system originates.  
So, a taxpayer can go to Court on the basis of these rights. An issue is, however, that in order 
to be  able to appeal with the Court, the person must at least be aware of the fact that informa-
tion is to be transferred to the other State. So a notification is essential. These notification 
rights are therefore an essential part of the Privacy Directive.  
 
Question 11) What does the legal protection of the taxpayer look like when the Member 
States cooperate to collect the tax? What are the limits to the obligation to provide assistance 
in your country? 
Answer 11) In article 78 of the Guidance on Tax Recovery 2008 (Leidraad Invordering 2008, 
Annex to the Decree of 12 June 2008, nr. CPP2008/1137M VN 2008/37.3) the Dutch policy 
regarding international tax collection is included. The Netherlands will not comply with a 
request to collect foreign tax if the amount due is less than € 227, unless a lower threshold has 
been agreed on by the Netherlands and the other state. The Dutch tax collector will not require 
international assistance in the collection of Dutch tax debts  if the amount due is less than € 
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2269, unless specific circumstances justify a lower threshold. However, if more than one in-
ternational arrangement for assistance of the collection of taxes applies, the arrangement 
which gives the broadest possibilities will be applied.  In the same way as a resident taxpayer 
may object to national measures to collect tax, the person involved may object to the collec-
tion of foreign tax by the Dutch tax authorities at the Dutch lower Court. The other party in 
such proceedings before the Court is the Dutch tax collector. Furthermore, the taxpayer may 
request postponement of payment in the same way as for Dutch tax debts. If such request is 
denied, the person may file an objection. Postponement will not be granted in cases of fraud. 
Question 12) Can the information exchanged under the Council Directive 77/799/EEC be 
used in a criminal trial? Is the requesting State’s tax administration obliged to ask the re-
quested State for permission to use this information in criminal trials? Does the tax admini-
stration of the Member State that has obtained the information need a specific authorization 
by the national judge? 
 
Answer 12) This is only allowed when it concerns a fiscal crime, and on the condition of pre-
vious consent of the other Member State, as  included in article 7 of the Directive. 
As regards the second question on permission required from the requested state, in  the Neth-
erlands’opinion this requirement can be read in article 7, par. 1 of the Directive, which con-
fines the disclosure of the information to the taxpayer,  the officials of the tax administration, 
and the persons and authorities concerned with the assessment of taxes and the Court proceed-
ings on that subject. No mention however is made of the “prosecution” concerning taxes. So, 
art.7, par. 3 has to be invoked, which makes it possible for the receiving state to use the in-
formation for other purposes, if the supplying state has agreed to that.   
 
Generally, the tax administration of the Member State that has obtained the information does 
not need a specific authorization by the national judge. Only in cases where  there is or was 
some criminal law-suit in the Netherland in the same (or an adherent) case.   
 
Question 13) From a more general point of view, which is the relationship and influence be-
tween criminal and tax proceedings and judgements in your country? Are there any national 
reforms to facilitate the use of bank or financial information as evidence in tax law cases? 
 
Answer 13) There is no bank secrecy in the Netherlands. Banks have to automatically provide 
certain information on bank accounts to the tax authorities. Furthermore, similar to other cor-
porate income tax payers, banks are obliged to provide information on request of the tax au-
thorities if this information is necessary for the levying of taxes of third parties (e.g. custom-
ers of the bank). The tax authorities may use this information as evidence in tax law cases. As 
the use of bank or financial information as evidence in tax law cases is already possible, no 
reforms are expected in this regard. Recently, a discussion has started on the special position 
of  banks in providing bulk information on their clients. This position was of course,  already 
affected by the obligations under the Savings Directive, but in the opinion of the Netherlands 
tax administration it would be an improvement if banks would  be obliged to provide bulk 
information on the payments of dividends for the exchange of suchinformation.This informa-
tion  could then also be included in  the Memoranda of Understanding for automatic exchange 
of information, the Netherlands have concluded  with other Member States.  
 
Question 14) Is there a claim for damages for a taxable person if a state discloses his or hers 
commercial, industrial or professional secret by giving information to another Member State? 
If so, what does the claim for damage look like? 
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Answer 14) It is possible for the taxpayer to claim that the  supplying of certain information 
would involve a violation of his business secret, and would cause harm and damage to the 
taxpayer who delivered the information. In that case, the taxpayer would have to prove that 
there is such a secret, that damage is to be expected if the information is used in the other 
state. The judge will decide how the interest of the taxpayer is to be weighed against the inter-
ests of the other state. This will be done on the basis of the limitations to the obligation to 
exchange information, which are mentioned in the Act on the international assistance in the 
levying of taxes and which are in their turn derived from those mentioned in the Directive and 
in the relevant tax treaties. If the judge follows the arguments of the taxpayer/informant, the 
information will not be supplied. It is of course also possible that the judge decides that the 
information nevertheless has to be supplied.  
If the secrecy–provision would have been violated in the receiving state, and this has caused 
harm or damage to the taxpayer who delivered the information, then  international law entitles 
this taxpayer/informant to go to Court in the other state, along with the secrecy protection of 
that state. This is however very burdensome and full of uncertainties. In view of that some 
authors have stated that there ought to be an international provision in the Directive and in the 
OECD Model Convention about responsibility for  failure in observing the secrecy obligation 
in the receiving state. 
 
Question 15) Does the taxable person get informed when information concerning him or her 
is exchanged on basis of the “Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments”? Does legal protection exist in these cases? 
If so, please describe what the legal protection looks like. 
 
Answer 15) There is no individual information right  in this case, because this is automatic 
exchange of information, drawn from databases, which are filled by the banks on the basis of 
their obligation under European law, and because of the fact that the Directive has been pub-
lished. Their interests have already been largely discussed in a European context during the 
process of negotiation and dialogue about the Directive between the Member States and the 
EC, and also in the domestic context. 
 
Question 16) If there is an infringement during a tax examination in State A (under request of 
State B) is the taxable person able to contest this infringement and the following tax assess-
ment by State B’s tax authority? 
 
Answer 16) In most of the cases of mutual assistance the person in State A, who has to de-
liver the requested information (the informant), is someone else than the person in State B 
whose tax liability is to be determined with the help of this information. So if there would be 
some infringement of the domestic law in the requested country, it should be possible for the 
person in State A (the informant) to challenge this infringement there. In the Netherlands the 
investigated taxpayer can object to this infringement while objecting against the decision to 
supply information announced (or communicated) to him in the (previous) notification. Once 
the information is transferred, the requesting country ill generally consider it as being prop-
erly acquired, and thus it can possibly lead to an assessment.  
If the infringement had concerned a matter of international law, the taxpayer B in the receiv-
ing country will be able to challenge it in Court when he is challenging the assessment (as 
illegitimate evidence). 
 
Question 17) Have problems of a potential infringement of privacy legal rules deriving from 
the mutual assistance occurred in your country? 
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Answer 17) As a receiving country,  the Netherlands did not have problems on the matters of 
secrecy or confidentiality of foreign information, as far as  we are aware of.  However: there 
is a discussion going on concerning Freedom of Information legislation with respect to inter-
state correspondence. The competent authorities consider this communication as confidential 
and so do not disclose this to the taxpayer at the time of the investigation. Our “Raad van 
State” (State Council for administrative proceedings) agrees with that position. 
